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Regulating private actors’ participation in policymaking is key to democratic governance. 
Across political systems, targeted transparency is used to regulate lobbying activities. We 
examine the extent to which primary regulatory targets (organizations with frequent access to 
policymakers) support the architecture of lobbying regulation regimes set up as voluntary 
transparency clubs. Our empirical testing ground is the European Union. We conceptualize the 
EU Transparency Register as a Voluntary Transparency Club, elaborate on its club goods, and 
derive a set of theoretical expectations about its members’ evaluations of the club’s 
transparency standards, membership size, and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. We 
find significant differences between members and non-members’ assessment regarding the 
regulatory performance of this transparency club. Members with frequent access to executive 
policymakers criticize the club’s transparency standards and do not consider the Register a 
useful regulatory instrument. Yet, they support expanding its regulatory remit and increasing 





Regulating interest groups’ participation in policymaking constitutes an indispensable 
prerequisite for transparent, accountable and legitimate democratic government. Across 
political systems, different regulatory regimes are used to manage lobbying and private actors’ 
interactions with decision-makers. These regimes vary in regulatory stringency and 
instruments, but they all have the same goal: increasing the amount of public information about 
interactions between public and private actors, and the latter’s attempts to shape and influence 
decision-making (Holman and Luneburg 2012). Lobbying regulation constitutes thus a form 
of social disclosure policy in which the costs of regulation are concentrated on the private 
actors that disclose information publicly, while the benefits are widely dispersed across the 
general public (Bunea 2018). A classic argument made in the literature on the politics of 
regulation is that an uneven distribution of regulatory costs and benefits usually leads regulated 
actors to systematically oppose and criticize the regulatory regime (Wilson 1980). For 
lobbying regulation, this argument holds true especially for those interest organizations seeking 
frequent access to decision-makers. For them, lobbying regulation is highly salient since it may 
create additional access barriers, registration costs and administrative hurdles. However, the 
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more recent literature on transparency and information disclosure as a regulatory policy 
indicates that the regulated targets ‘often end up supporting’ regulatory regimes that are based 
on disclosure of public information (Graham 2002: 140). Reputational concerns, a motivation 
to avoid more excessive forms of regulation or an interest in increasing the amount of 
information ‘about their competitors and potential partners’ may contribute towards increasing 
the motivation of regulated actors to endorse and support lobbying regulatory systems that 
entail information disclosure (De Fine Licht and Naurin 2016: 222). 
 We examine this theoretical puzzle in the case of the EU lobbying regulation regime, a 
system of governance relying exclusively on information disclosure and targeted transparency 
to regulate interest groups’ participation in policymaking with the help of a Transparency 
Register (TR) (Smismans 2014). We ask to what extent do interest groups with frequent access 
to decision-makers support the architecture of the EU lobbying regulation system and its 
further institutionalization recently proposed by the European Commission? We focus 
analytically on organizations with frequent access to high-level officials in the EU executive 
body. We build conceptually on a well-established line of research exploring private actors’ 
access to policymakers and institutional venues as a key (explanatory or dependent) variable 
in studies of lobbying and executive politics (Beyers 2004, Eising 2007, Binderkrantz et al. 
2015, Dür and Mateo 2016). We contribute to this literature by investigating the effect of 
frequent access to policymakers on private actors’ expressed preferences on specific policy 
issues. Specifically, we examine how access levels shape actors’ perceptions of and preferences 
for a certain design of lobbying regulation. We consider these actors to be analytically and 
empirically different from policy insiders, which denote a structurally more sophisticated and 
powerful category of stakeholders than those with frequent access to decision-makers.1  
Organizations with frequent access to high-level Commission officials are in our view 
in a uniquely interesting and relevant position to evaluate EU lobbying regulation. First, they 
have a high stake in its regulatory design and enforcement mechanisms since they incur directly 
the costs of information disclosure. They are legitimate ‘affected actors’ (Fung 2013). By 
having frequent direct access to the regulatory agenda-setter, they are in a unique position to 
advise on and potentially shape the structuring of the regulatory regime as ‘prominent’ affected 
actors (Halpin and Fraussen 2017). Second, they have extended direct experience with the 
                                                        
1 Bunea (2017:58, 2018:393) presents a compelling discussion of this distinction, arguing that policy insiders are 
actors enjoying a special (structural) status in EU policymaking because they possess several distinctive 
characteristics: they are part of exclusive consultations forums, have immediate and direct access to policymakers, 
possess a broad representative mandate and have a keen and consistent interest in certain policy issues, becoming 
key actors in policy networks articulated in specific policy areas. Insiders possess more relevant features than just 
frequent access to policymakers. 
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regime and have developed in-depth knowledge about its dynamics, following repeated 
interactions with decision-makers within the boundaries of this regulatory framework. They 
are thus ‘the best source of information’ for decision-makers, which should give them ‘a degree 
of leverage over regulatory arrangements’ and proposed regulatory reforms (Knill and 
Lenschow 2004). Third, they are key players in the successful implementation of the regime 
since they are actors that must comply with its requirements. Organizations with frequent 
access are both competent and highly interested to perform a systematic evaluation of the EU 
lobbying regulation status quo and reform. Their evaluation provides valuable insights into 
how existing regulatory measures balance the public interest against private actors’ costs of 
regulatory compliance, contribute to good governance by ensuring proportionate regulation 
and succeed in providing positive public externalities by reducing the risk of corruption and 
biased representation in policymaking.  
Understanding these key actors’ positions on matters of supranational lobbying regulation 
is essential given the high stake of regulating private actors’ participation in policymaking for 
the legitimacy and accountability of the EU system of governance, and the ever-present theme 
of ‘regulatory capture’ raised in the literature on regulatory governance when discussing 
regulators-regulatees interactions (Stigler 1971). Furthermore, lobbying regulation has 
important consequences for policy representation and inequality (Davidson 2017). The 
literature on US lobbying regulation indicates that the stringency of lobbying regulations has 
significant effects on levels of political inequality (Flavin 2015) and bias in interest 
representation (Ozymy 2010). Observing the support (or lack thereof) of actors with frequent 
access to decision-makers offers thus indirect insights into their assessment of levels of 
inequality and bias in EU interest representation. From an economic perspective, lobbying 
regulation also matters: by managing access to policymakers, it may indirectly contribute to 
preventing economic inefficiencies and harmful distribution of taxpayers’ money to certain 
industries and producers, and the pursuit of protectionist trade policies (Berndt and Svendsen 
2016).  
To answer the research question, we build on the club theory perspective developed by 
Potoski and Prakash (2009) to explain the design and performance of voluntary environmental 
programs (VEPs). We conceptualize the EU lobbying regulation regime as a ‘transparency 
club’ whose members are interested in building a good organizational reputation by producing 
positive social externalities (public goods) in the form of information disclosure and increased 
transparency about private actors’ participation in policymaking (see also Năstase and 
Muurmans 2018). We elaborate on the ‘club goods’ provided by this transparency club and 
derive a set of theoretical expectations about members’ evaluations of the club’s (transparency) 
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standards, membership size, and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. We argue that 
actors with frequent access to policymakers have incentives to support creating and 
maintaining a good club brand name and reputation in three ways: by supporting stringent 
transparency standards; advocating the expansion of club’s membership; demanding stricter 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of transparency standards. We test this argument on 
an original dataset providing information about interest groups’ evaluations of the EU TR and 
their direct meetings with high-level officials reported on the EC’s website. We find that ‘club 
members’ with frequent access criticize the transparency standards status quo regarding the 
quality of information disclosed by regulatory targets and the online medium used to provide 
this information. They strongly support the inclusion of the broadest set of organizations in the 
regulatory remit of the Register, advocating an increase in the club membership size. No 
significant differences are observed regarding their support for stricter monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms of club’s transparency standards. We also find that the interest type 
represented is a strong predictor of an organization’s evaluation of TR’s performance. Public 
interest organizations are significantly more critical regarding TR usefulness as a regulatory 
tool, and more likely to advocate the adoption of stricter measures aimed at naming and 
shaming non-compliant actors. Organizations representing public authorities strongly oppose 
the expansion of this transparency club’s membership to more organizational entities such as 
(elected) local or regional authorities.  
Our study speaks to the literature on regulatory governance (Christiansen 2011) and that 
on the design and evaluation of lobbying regulation regimes (Chari et al. 2010, Greenwood 
2011, Greenwood and Dreger 2013, Smismans 2014, Bunea 2018). We contribute to the 
literature in three ways. Conceptually, we significantly develop a line of research proposed by 
Năstase and Muurmans (2018) that uses the lenses of the economic club theory to conceptualize 
the EU lobbying regulation regime as a voluntary transparency club. This approach helps us 
provide a new and more nuanced understanding of regulated actors’ incentives structure 
regarding the design and performance of this regulatory regime. Theoretically, we develop an 
innovative argument that takes into account club goods and reputational benefits of 
membership in a ‘transparency club’. This explains how different constituencies of interests 
position themselves regarding the design and implementation of lobbying regulation through 
targeted transparency depending on a key aspect of their lobbying experience: the frequency 
of direct meetings (access) to policymakers. This explanatory approach is currently missing in 
the literature on lobbying (Bunea and Baumgartner 2014). Empirically, we analyze an original 
dataset and conduct one of the very few empirical analyses of the substantive consequences of 
having access to policymakers on interest groups’ expressed policy positions (evaluations) on 
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a key and very specific governance issue, i.e. lobbying regulation. We provide the first 
systematic empirical test embedded in a large-n research design of some of the key observable 
implications resulting from conceptualizing the TR as a voluntary transparency club. Different 
from Năstase and Muurmans’ qualitative analysis of reputational and instrumental motivations 
for members to join this club, our study is able to examine the evaluations of both TR-members 
and non-members regarding its performance as a transparency club and to examine the effects 
of club membership on perceptions of club’s performance.  
 We proceed in four steps: we first present the conceptual and theoretical framework in 
sections one and two. Section three presents the research design, and section four the analyses. 
Section five concludes.   
 
Lobbying Regulation as a Transparency Club 
  
 The EU regulates interest groups’ participation in policymaking through a targeted 
transparency system whose main regulatory instrument is a state-of-the-art online 
Transparency Register. A Joint TR Secretariat, managed in collaboration by staff of the 
Commission and the Parliament, administers it. Formally, joining the Register is voluntary but 
in practice decision-makers do not meet non-registered organizations. This informally makes 
the Register de facto mandatory and in a recent policy development (December 2017), the 
Council of the EU agreed that its General-Secretariat would be covered by a new 
Interinstitutional Agreement on a Mandatory TR. The Register asks organizations to provide 
information about their organizational profiles, number of staff engaged in lobbying, policy 
areas of interest, membership in expert groups and advisory committees, aggregate information 
about yearly lobbying expenses. From an institutional perspective, the Register constitutes an 
imperfect compromise solution to a long-standing deadlock marking the interinstitutional 
dialogue over the design of supranational lobbying regulation in which the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Council hold different preferences regarding the architecture and stringency 
of the regulatory regime (Bouwen 2007). Consequently, the Register was criticized for its 
voluntary nature (Greenwood 2011), poor quality of information disclosed (Greenwood and 
Dreger 2013), ineffectiveness in redressing the information asymmetry between citizens and 
interest groups (Bunea 2018), and its limited contribution to legitimizing supranational 
decision-making (Smismans 2014).  
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 We analyze the TR from the perspective of its primary regulatory targets, namely 
organizations that seek and get (frequent) access to EC high-level decision-makers.2 These 
actors constitute a specific subset of the entire population of actors lobbying or interested in 
lobbying EU institutions and policymakers that represent the overall population of regulatory 
targets. They are in a particularly relevant and theoretically interesting position to evaluate the 
Register for reasons outlined in the introduction.  
To theorize these actors’ support (or lack thereof) for the Register as a regulatory 
regime we build on the theoretical framework proposed by Potoski and Prakash (2009) to 
explain the creation and performance of voluntary environmental programs (VEPs) by 
conceptualizing them as voluntary clubs. These programs ‘require participants to produce 
environmental public goods beyond the requirements of applicable government laws’ (Prakash 
and Potoski 2013: 400). By ‘voluntary’ the authors refer to ‘the absence of any state mandate 
or legal requirements that firms must join these programs’ and indicate that ‘participation is 
“voluntary” even if participants’ stakeholders employ legal means to persuade or otherwise 
induce participation’ (Idem). This approach defines voluntary programs ‘as efforts to correct a 
failure in the market for environmental virtue […] by mitigating information problems between 
firms and their stakeholders’ (Ibid: 401). This theoretical perspective starts from the 
assumption that the production of the environmental public goods entails some costs that 
private actors are willing to incur so as to increase their environmental reputation with 
regulators and the general public, who are external stakeholders in the environmental policy. 
These stakeholders are interested in monitoring and rewarding with their appreciation firms 
with highly environmental-friendly practices, but they cannot do it because they lack sufficient 
information to discern between environmental-friendly and environmental-polluting firms. 
VEPs adjust and redress this information market failure: they allow environmental-friendly 
firms to signal the public and regulators their virtuous, environmental-compliant behavior and 
thus increase the amount of information available to the public to discern between 
environmental leaders and laggards, and to reward them accordingly with their consumer 
choices and regulatory measures. As voluntary clubs, VEPs produce public goods 
(environmental protection) and club goods that are excludable and non-rival, such as a good 
reputation for being an environmental-friendly economic actor.  
Building on this framework, we conceptualize the EU TR as a regulatory regime that 
resembles a voluntary transparency club: the public good produced is increased transparency 
                                                        
2 Commissioners, cabinet members and Directors. The Commission does not yet provide a similar list of meetings 
for lower-level policymakers, despite their relatively high frequency. 
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about private actors’ participation in decision-making, and the opportunity to avoid corruption 
and biased interest representation and policymaking. The main club good provided to its 
members is a commendable reputation for being ethical, socially responsible and politically 
accountable organizations. Additional, indirect club goods are also provided: the club allows 
members to avoid stricter (and consequently costlier) forms of lobbying regulation, to gather 
information about other actors lobbying policymakers, to get timely information provided 
automatically by email to Register members about upcoming policy initiatives and 
consultations, and to get access to policymakers.  
Several aspects justify this innovative conceptualization. First, clubs are ‘institutions 
or rule systems’ that are (voluntarily) joined by private actors because they provide their 
members with a set of excludable ‘club goods’ that cannot be enjoyed by non-members 
(Potoski and Prakash 2009: 20). The most valuable club good is the club’s brand name: its 
public reputation. Affiliation with a club’s brand constitutes a valuable reputational asset and 
signals relevant information about non-observable behaviors that club-members want to 
convey to external stakeholders (decision-makers and the public) (Kotchen and van’t Veld 
2009: 68). Voluntary clubs establish thus a ‘new market for […] reputation - one could perhaps 
call it a market for virtue’ (Vogel 2005, cited in Potoski and Prakash 2009: 5). Their club good 
is both excludable and non-rival: ‘members’ association with the club does not necessarily 
diminish the value others receive from the brand. Indeed […] one firm’s membership can often 
enhance the value that other members receive’ (Idem: 2). Or at least for as long as shirking 
does not occur and stains the club’s reputation (Potoski and Prakash 2011: 90). 
The EU TR constitutes an institutional arrangement set up to ensure ethical and 
transparent lobbying practices and to keep its members accountable and compliant with a set 
of information disclosure standards and Code of Conduct norms. Although there is an informal 
rule that decision-makers would not meet non-registered organizations, the voluntary nature of 
the Register resides in the fact that organizations’ ‘behavior is voluntary in the sense that it is 
not coerced by the state via regulation or statute’ (Potoski and Prakash 2009: 17) and it’s 
voluntary despite institutional incentives to join (information and access). As a transparency 
club, the Register requires its members to publicly disclose information about lobbying 
activities, interests, coalitions and financial resources. Given its high publicity and consolidated 
online profile, it provides its members with an important club good: the reputation of law-
abiding and ethical actors that are complying with certain transparency requirements. Similar 
to other voluntary clubs, the Register provides its members with the political and public 
‘license to operate’ and participate in policymaking (Idem: 20). 
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 Second, clubs seek to shape actors’ ‘cost-benefit calculus to channel their private self-
interest in ways that lead to the reduction of negative externalities and/or production of [social] 
positive externalities’ (Idem: 3). The ‘membership fee’ is ‘the cost of producing this positive 
social externality’ or public good (Idem: 21). The TR aims increasing the amount of public 
information about interest groups’ interactions with decision-makers. In exchange for a 
commendable public reputation, organizations are asked to actively contribute to producing the 
public good of increased transparency. The membership fee is information disclosure in an 
electronic format. Stakeholders external to this transparency club (policymakers and the public) 
are beneficiaries of this public good which helps bridging the information gap between them 
and lobby organizations about the latter’s participation in policymaking. Furthermore, a 
commendable public reputation is likely not an end in itself, but a means to obtain very tangible 
benefits when it comes to public scrutiny and policy demands: not only that club members are 
perceived as open and transparent by the public (thus gaining public trust) but they are also 
perceived as such by policymakers, gaining their confidence too. This confidence might 
increase instead chances for lobbying success. 
Third, since a club’s brand reputation depends extensively on how much members 
comply with its standards, clubs set up monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to ‘ensure 
that the members live up to their program obligations’ and ‘signal to club members that their 
adherence to club obligations is under scrutiny and shirking will be sanctioned’ (Potoski and 
Prakash 2009: 9). These mechanisms are aimed to prevent classic collective action problems 
such as shirking and free-riding. A club’s credibility depends on its members’ compliance with 
its requirements. Therefore, the TR operates a monitoring and enforcement mechanism that 
relies on ‘sanctioning by the program sponsor’ (Idem: 26): staff members of the Joint TR 
Secretariat scrutinize online the quality of information provided by joining organizations and 
how well members comply with the registration and updating requirements. For example, a 
key sanction administrators use is the unilateral removal of non-compliant actors from 
Register.  
 
Membership, Access and Evaluation of the Club’s Performance  
This conceptualization has important observable implications for how different 
constituencies of interest organizations may differ in their evaluations of the Register as a 
lobbying regulation regime. A first intuitive difference is that between registered organizations 
(club-members) and non-registered organizations (non-members). Registered organizations 
are significantly more interested in the Register’s brand reputation. Similar to most clubs, the 
Register’s membership is heterogeneous: it includes actors organized as European federations, 
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national associations, regional associations or individual lobby organizations that represent a 
variety of socio-economic interests (business, labor, environmental, consumers, etc.). Some 
lobby more actively than others. A key implication is that not all club members appreciate to 
the same extent the ‘club good’ of a good reputation: members interested in getting frequent 
access to decision-makers attach a higher salience to the Register’s brand reputation because 
they benefit more frequently and in a more straightforward fashion from it. A commendable 
reputation as a lobbying actor is far more consequential for them than for actors with less 
frequent access. Therefore, we contend that a theoretically relevant and conceptually 
interesting categorization of Register-member organizations is that between members with 
frequent access to decision-makers, members with less frequent access, and members with no 
access. Empirically, our analyses distinguish between Register *non-members, *members with 
no access, *members with some access and *members with frequent access. 
Building on Potoski and Prakash (2009: 31; 2013), we argue that the Register’s 
reputation as a transparency club depends on three analytical dimensions: the stringency of 
transparency standards, its membership size, and the credibility of its monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms.  
Actors with frequent access are particularly interested in the Register’s brand reputation 
as a transparency club for reasons that emphasize the close link between club reputation and 
its members’ individual organizational reputations. First, actors with frequent access are 
interested in repeated interactions with decision-makers and thus have strong incentives to 
cooperate with regulators to build a credible, long-lasting reputation that would persist 
throughout time and meetings. Since ‘reputation building takes time and is expensive, the 
desire to benefit from an existing trustworthy reputation’, or to systematically build one, is high 
(Potoski and Prakash 2011: 89). Second, the Register provides ‘a low-cost tool for signaling 
commitment to producing positive social externalities’ that allows external stakeholder to 
easily differentiate ‘leaders from laggards’ (Idem: 25) in complying with ethical lobbying rules. 
Actors with frequent access see the high reputational benefit that can be gained from a 
relatively low-cost opportunity, and prefer this form of soft, transparency-based lobbying 
regulation to a stronger (hierarchical, command-and-control) and potentially costlier form of 
regulatory intervention. Third, Register membership facilitates access to decision-makers and 
to timely information about policy initiatives and institutional opportunities to shape 
policymaking. For these actors, the club’s membership is highly beneficial in light of their 
heightened interest in getting access to policymaking. Therefore, they have incentives to 
preserve a good brand reputation for this transparency club that they want to preserve and 
maintain. In light of heated debates about the democratic legitimacy and accountability of EU 
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decision-making and the elite pluralist nature of supranational interest representation, a 
commendable reputation for ethical and transparent lobbying is particularly important 
(Smismans 2014).  
Therefore, we argue that TR-members with frequent access to decision-makers have 
particularly strong incentives to advocate for stringent ‘club standards’ regarding the quality 
of information disclosure in both substantive and procedural terms. Information that is 
accurate, easy to identify by external stakeholders and comprehensively covers a wide variety 
of lobbying activities represents a high quality public good and a social externality that 
enhances the reputation of the Register as a transparency club and consequently of its members. 
In addition, high quality disclosure standards increase the entry-cost for new members, which 
prevents the adverse selection of untrustworthy members that would not comply with the club’s 
transparency standards and thus spoil the club’s brand reputation. Equally important, club 
standards ‘critically shape’ the social externalities (public goods) produced by its members: 
more stringent standards are more likely to lead to a higher quality provision of public goods 
(Potoski and Prakash 2009: 31) and ‘correlate with the level of [external] stakeholder 
appreciation that club participants can expect to receive’ (Potoski and Prakash 2013: 403).   
In light of consistent criticism of TR data quality and lack of regulatory effectiveness 
and sustainability, an observable implication of this argument is the expectation of a systematic 
pattern of negative evaluations expressed by actors with frequent access regarding the TR 
status quo describing its standards of information disclosure. The assumption is that a negative 
evaluation is an indirect demand/preference for higher transparency standards than ones 
currently ensured by the TR. Actors with frequent access are interested in maximizing the 
reputational benefits of their club-membership and making sure the TR’s public reputation is 
uncontested. They know that suboptimal, contested and criticized transparency standards bear 
a potentially high public reputation cost for them: organizations complying with contested 
standards can be accused of playing ‘shambolic politics’ transparency games and engaging in 
window-dressing.3 We therefore expect that:  
H1 (Club Standards hypothesis): TR-members with frequent access to decision-makers are 
more likely to support higher standards of information disclosure as part of the TR and are 
thus more likely to criticize its information disclosure settings.  
 
 Another relevant ingredient of a club’s brand reputation is its membership size: 
‘positive network effects create increasing returns to scale club membership: with every 
                                                        
3 Theoretically, actors wanting less stringent disclosure standards could also be more critical of current TR 
disclosure settings. However, we consider this a less likely scenario because these actors know that in the absence 
of current TR transparency standards, they run the risk of being subjected to harder (command-and-control) and 
costlier forms of lobbying regulation. For them, current standards are therefore a lesser regulatory ‘evil’.   
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additional member, the marginal benefit of being associated with club membership increases 
or ‘the marginal cost of creating benefits decreases’ (Potoski and Prakash 2009: 33). Having 
more club members allows ‘advertising a voluntary club broadly among [external] 
stakeholders’ and therefore ‘the value a club member derived from club participation increases 
with every additional firm joining it’ (Potoski and Prakash 2013: 403). A larger membership 
size enhances a club’s reputation by increasing its credibility and ability to provide the public 
good aimed for, thus having a more significant potential social/systemic impact, while also 
enhancing the opportunities for peer-monitoring amongst club members. An increased 
membership also means that the costs of information disclosure are more evenly distributed in 
the population of organizations interested in shaping and influencing supranational 
policymaking, and consequently that Register members do not incur a structural and 
informational disadvantage by revealing information about themselves that non-members 
could use to their advantage. In the case of such voluntary clubs, reputational benefits come 
from compliance with higher regulatory and behavioral standards and not from the exclusive 
character of the club. Since TR-members with frequent access are particularly interested in 
enhancing the Register’s club brand reputation, they have incentives to support measures that 
would increase its membership. We expect that: 
H2 (Club Membership hypothesis): TR-members with frequent access to decision-makers are 
more likely to support extending the regulatory scope of the TR to more organizational entities 
and expand its membership. 
 
Lastly, a club’s brand reputation depends considerably on the quality of its monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms, which prevent free riding and members’ shirking from the club’s 
standards and obligations. A club’s reputation is only as good as its members’ collective and 
individual behaviors and reputations are: ‘[i]f shirking occurs with sufficient frequency, the 
reputation of the [club] is likely to suffer’ (Potoski and Prakash 2013: 404). Therefore, TR-
members with frequent access are particularly interested to ensure that its monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms are up for the task, able to keep club members to behaving ethically 
and transparent, and to prevent shirking. We expect that: 
H3 (Club Monitoring and Enforcement hypothesis): TR-members with frequent access to 
decision-makers are more likely to support stricter monitoring and enforcement rules of 




 We test our argument on an original dataset providing information about interest 
groups’ expressed evaluations of the TR and their levels of direct access to high-level 
Commission officials. We built this dataset in two stages. First, we identified groups’ 
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evaluations of the Register based on their responses to the EC public consultation conducted 
during March-June 2016 on its proposal for an interinstitutional agreement on a mandatory 
Register. This consultation employed an online questionnaire that allows estimating actors’ 
responses to a set of 14 questions directly or indirectly linked to the stringency of TR 
transparency standards, membership size and its monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. We 
examine the responses of 632 organizations participating in the consultation and agreeing to 
make their answers public. Table 1 details the substantive content of the questions we used to 
measure our 14 dependent variables. Questions 1 to 11 allow estimating groups’ support for 
the stringency of transparency standards: they ask respondents to indicate whether the register 
is a useful tool for regulating lobbying (q1), how they evaluate the Register’s website features 
(q2-q6), if the right type of information is required from registrants (q7), how they evaluate the 
overall TR data quality (q8), whether the Code of Conduct is based on sound rules and 
principles (q9), whether further interactions with policymakers should be included in the TR 
regulatory scope (q10) and if the Council of the EU should be covered by a mandatory Register 
(q11). 
 Question 12 asked whether the scope of the Register should change to include or 
exclude some organizational entities (i.e. churches, local authorities, parties). Answers to this 
question provide information about actors’ preferences concerning their desired TR (club) 
membership size. Questions 13 and 14 asked whether the present procedure to deal with alerts 
and complaints for non-compliance with transparency standards is adequate, and whether a 
new sanction for non-compliance should be introduced, namely the public naming and shaming 
of non-compliant actors. Columns 2-4 in Table 1 present the categories of responses allowed 
by the closed-ended questionnaire and their frequency distribution across actors. Most answers 
were coded as ordinal categorical: ‘disagree’, ‘partially agree’, ‘fully agree’; or ‘poor’, 
‘average’, ‘good’. Questions 10, 11 and 14 entailed dichotomous answers. Column 5 indicates 
the total number of ‘no opinion’ or ‘no answers’ which are treated as missing values in the 
empirical analyses. The number of missing values varies across questions, with some items 
displaying higher frequencies (e.g. q5 or q13). This is consistent with previous research 
indicating that stakeholders engage differently with various EU consultation items, and decide 
to express preferences regarding some issues while staying silent on others (Bunea 2017). 
Methodologically, the use of a consultation survey implies that classic approaches to address 
the issue of missing data (i.e. multiple imputations) are not available to our research, since we 
lack enough identification variables. Our decision to use this consultation survey despite these 
constraints is justified by the fact that such consultation surveys constitute a rich and fairly 
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In step two, we identified the total number of direct meetings organizations in our 
dataset had with EC high-level officials, as reported on the EC official website, by using a web-
scraping method implemented in R. We coded information about all meetings reported between 
November 2014 (when this online reporting function was introduced) and the end of June 2016 
(when the consultation ended). We chose this cut-off point as we are interested in exploring 
how having previously experienced various levels of direct access to decision-makers impacts 
groups’ evaluations measured at a specific point in time.  
We crossed-checked the reliability of our data against the meetings reported by 
LobbyFacts.eu and we found the same number of reported meetings for the examined 
organizations. In our dataset, 455 actors had no meetings with Commission officials for the 
considered time frame, while 177 actors had between 1 and 122 meetings. The average number 
of meetings per actor is 3.4 (sd. 10.28). Additionally, based on organizational self-reports, we 
know that at the time of consultation, 111 organizations were not registered in the TR, whereas 
521 were. Therefore, we distinguish empirically between four categories of organizations: 111 
actors were non-registered/non-members and with no access; 344 actors were registered but 
had no access (no meetings); 114 actors were registered and had some access (1-10 meetings); 
63 actors were registered and had frequent access (11-122 meetings). Our explanatory variable 
is coded at organization level as ordinal categorical, indicating the actor was: *TR non-member 
(not registered), *TR-member with no access, *TR-member with some access, *TR-member 
with frequent access. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of meetings per interest type represented by the 
organization and indicates that 45 of 63 actors with frequent meetings with Commission 
officials were business organizations (71.42%), while 13 were public interest organizations 
(20.6%). In the category of actors with some access (1-10 meetings), business actors were also 
the majority (55.26%), while public interest organizations represented 27.2% and professional 
organizations 9.65%. Amongst registered organizations with no meetings, 34.94% were public 
interest organizations, 24.4% business, 16.5% public authorities, 12.31% professional 
associations and 11.87% consultancy groups. The majority of non-registered actors were local 





 Our analyses control for the interest type represented by organizations in our dataset. 
The literature indicates that this plays an important role in how actors evaluate lobbying 
regulation: actors representing public interests criticized the EU Register for its design and 
regulatory effectiveness, while business groups criticized its regulatory performance and 
sustainability (Greenwood and Dreger 2013, Bunea 2018). We identified this information 
based on the EC data file presenting the 2016 public consultation results and categorized 
respondents into six types of interests represented: business (219), consultancies (61), 
professional associations (71), public subnational authorities (78) and public interest 




 We use binary and ordinal logistic regression analysis to test our hypotheses. Table 3 
examines hypothesis 1, stating that TR-members with frequent access should support more 
stringent transparency standards and adopt a more critical stance regarding the information 




 Models 1-11 use as reference category organizations that were TR non-members (not 
registered). These models present a mixed and intriguing picture regarding hypothesis 1. They 
indicate a few, substantively relevant, significant differences between Register-members and 
non-members, and most importantly between TR-members with frequent access and all others 
regarding their evaluations of club’s transparency standards. 
In line with our hypothesis, model 8 indicates that TR-members with frequent access 
are significantly less likely than TR non-members to evaluate the overall quality of data 
currently disclosed in the Register as good. For these actors, the odds of a reply indicating a 
‘good data quality’ are 0.13 of the odds of ‘poor’ and ‘average data quality’ responses 
combined. TR-members with some access adopt a similar stance relative to non-members, but 
the coefficient is not significant. We interpret this as evidence that actors with frequent access 
do not consider the current quality of information disclosure standards adequate and that they 
prefer better transparency standards. The additional analyses presented in the appendix (tables 
A1 and A3) indicate the finding is robust when using different reference categories for the 
explanatory variable. 
Models 2 and 7 offer a potential explanation for this. Model 2 indicates actors with 
frequent access are significantly less likely than non-members to evaluate the TR website 
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design and structure as ‘good’. The odds of a ‘good website design’ evaluation are 0.46 of the 
odds of a ‘poor’ and ‘average website design’ evolution combined. The results are robust when 
changing the reference category for the explanatory variable (tables A1 and A3 in appendix). 
Furthermore, Model 7 shows that actors with frequent access are less likely to indicate that the 
right type of information is required from registrants, although the coefficient is not significant. 
Note that TR-members with some access share this negative evaluation of current information 
disclosure requirements and the coefficient is significant at 0.05 level. Table A3 in appendix 
confirms that actors with some access are significantly less likely than all others in our dataset 
to positively evaluate these requirements. The quality of publicized data, the information 
disclosed about regulatory targets and the design of the regulatory instrument are all key 
aspects for ensuring commendable transparency standards and a good transparency (club) 
reputation.  
TR-members with frequent access are also less likely to indicate the TR is a useful tool 
to regulate EU lobbying than non-registered actors (model 1). The coefficients are not 
statistically significant but point to a pattern of less favorable evaluations of the TR as an 
instrument for regulating transparency and lobbying behavior. This pattern is confirmed by the 
models presented in appendix: model 1 in table A1 indicates that actors with frequent access 
are significantly less likely than TR-members with no access to positively evaluate the TR as 
a useful regulatory tool (odds ratio: 0.26). Model 1 in table A3 indicates the same significant 
difference when comparing them to TR-members with some access (odds ratio: 0.42).  
Furthermore, model 1 indicates that registered actors with no access are significantly 
more likely to consider the Register a useful tool to regulate lobbying activities (odds ratio: 
2.72). This is consistent with the narrative that levels of access impact TR-members’ 
evaluations of the TR as a regulatory instrument: actors with no access and therefore less 
experience in accessing decision-makers are more positive about the Register than their more 
experienced counterparts.  
Interestingly, model 4 indicates that although actors with frequent access do not like 
the overall TR design, they are significantly more likely to positively evaluate its online search 
function. The odds of them indicating a ‘good’ evaluation vs. ‘poor’ and ‘average’ evaluation 
combined are 2.74 times higher. This may indicate that these actors have incentives to use the 
TR online search function to inform their organizational activities and check on other lobbying 
actors, when attempting to identify policy allies or foes. Adding to the intrigue, model 10 
indicates that actors with frequent access are less likely than TR non-members to support 
expanding the Register’s regulatory remit by making further interactions with decision-makers 
conditional upon registration, while model 11 indicates these actors were likely to support the 
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idea of including the Council of EU in a mandatory TR. Although the coefficients are not 
significant, the findings indicate a certain paradox in actors’ preferences regarding the 
Register’s regulatory remit:  regulation should not be expanded to cover more categories of 
lobbying activities but should cover an additional institutional lobbying venue. This latter 
measure would increase the information and certainty about access to a lobbying venue that 
remains largely obscured to private actors and public scrutiny. The results are robust when 
using different reference categories for the explanatory variable. 
Corroborated, these findings suggest actors with frequent access criticize the 
transparency club’s status quo regarding the quality of transparency standards in line with the 
Club Transparency Standards hypothesis, but are equivocal regarding the expansion of the 
regulatory remit of these standards to other institutions and lobbying activities. They show that 
levels of access to executive policymakers matter for how organizations evaluate these 
standards but that they may affect actors’ perceptions in more variegated ways than anticipated 
in our theoretical framework.  
The analyses clearly indicate the main critics of the club’s transparency standards are 
public interest organizations, which are significantly less likely to positively evaluate the TR 
website’s information availability (model 3) and search function (model 4), less likely to agree 
that the right type of information is required from registrants (model 7), that the overall TR 
data quality is adequate (model 8) and the Code of Conduct is based on the appropriate rules 
and principles (model 9). However, despite these shortcomings, these actors are significantly 
more likely to indicate that more lobbying interactions should require TR-registration (model 
10) and a mandatory TR should include the Council (model 11). 
Organizations representing public (local) authorities are also significantly less likely 
than business to appreciate the TR as a useful tool for regulating lobbying (model 1), its website 
information availability (model 3) and its overall data quality (model 8). Professional 
associations were also significantly less likely than business to positively evaluate the TR 
website features (models 3, 4, 6) and its code of conduct, a view they shared with consultancies 
(model 9). Professional associations and consultancies (especially law firms) claimed on 
several occasions they have their own codes of conduct to guide their participation in public 
policymaking and do not need additional codes of conduct. This suggests that interest type 
plays a more relevant role in structuring actors’ evaluations and preferences regarding EU 
lobbying regulation than the amount of access they have to policymakers.  
Model 12 in table 4 tests the Club Membership Size hypothesis. In line with our 
expectation, the results indicate that actors with frequent access are significantly more likely 
to indicate that the Register should include more organizational entities. The odds of them 
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indicating that more entities should be included vs. responses indicating to ‘keep status quo’ 
and ‘exclude entities’ combined are 2.81 higher for these actors. TR-members with some 
access are also significantly more likely than non-members to support this option that would 
increase TR-membership size and the odds of a response indicating this are 3.78 higher for 
them. This measure was however strongly opposed by organizations representing (local) public 
authorities that advocated against them having to join the Register in light of their 
democratically representative mandate in EU policymaking. Tables A2 and A4 in appendix 
indicate there are no significant differences on this issue when comparing TR-members with 




Models 13 and 14 do not support hypothesis 3 stating that TR-members with frequent 
access are more likely to support stricter TR monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Model 
13 indicates that these actors (and those with some access) are less likely to indicate that current 
procedures for dealing with alerts and complaints are adequate (indirectly suggesting that better 
mechanisms are required), and the coefficient is not significant. Yet, when compared to TR-
members with no access (model 13, table A2 in appendix), actors with frequent access are 
significantly less likely to positively evaluate the current procedures. The same is observed 
when comparing them to TR-members with some access although the difference is not 
statistically significant (model 13, table A4 in appendix). 
Model 14 indicates that TR-members with frequent access were less likely than TR 
non-members to indicate that actors breaching TR rules should be publicized, but the difference 
is not statistically significant. The analyses presented in appendix show that TR-members with 
frequent access were significantly less likely than TR-members with no access (model 14, table 
A2) and those with some access (model 14, table A4) to indicate support for this measure. 
Corroborated, these findings go against our hypothesis and indicate these actors’ lack of 
support for stricter penalty measures to punish non-compliance with the club’s transparency 
standards.  
Public interest organizations adopted instead a significantly different position: they 
were significantly less likely to positively evaluate the TR alerts and complaints procedure 
(similar to professional associations) and significantly more likely to indicate support for 
measures aimed at naming and shaming non-compliant organizations, thus advocating for 





 We conceptualized lobbying regulation regimes that rely on targeted transparency and 
information disclosure as voluntary transparency clubs. We investigated the extent to which 
membership in the transparency club affects actors’ assessment of key dimensions of the club’s 
regulatory set up and performance. We focused analytically on the perceptions of ‘regulatory 
connoisseurs’: organizations with frequent access to policymakers and thus with a long 
experience of the cost and benefits entailed by voluntary transparency clubs. We focused 
empirically on the EU Transparency Register, a quintessential example of lobbying regulation 
through targeted transparency. Adopting a cost-benefit analysis that emphasized reputational 
club goods, we argued that TR-members with frequent access to executive policymakers 
should advocate higher transparency standards, enlarged TR-membership and stricter 
monitoring mechanisms to enhance the club’s reputation and signal external stakeholders their 
law-abiding lobbying behavior. These actors have a high stake in a good TR performance since 
their participation in policymaking is a repeated game in which reputation matters. 
 We uncovered a puzzling structure of connoisseurs’ assessment of the club’s status quo: 
they are significantly more critical of the EU Register as a regulatory instrument and of its 
transparency standards, while being less enthusiastic about introducing stricter monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms that would improve the Register’s regulatory effectiveness and 
reputation. These actors are instead vocal supporters of extending the regulatory scope of the 
Register to more organizations, a position they share with all other TR-members irrespective 
of their level of access. Joining the Register implies the cost of producing public goods in the 
form of public information disclosure, which members would like to distribute more broadly 
amongst all actors involved in supranational lobbying. Furthermore, actors with frequent 
access think they receive more scrutiny and may consider TR-membership an unfair 
competitive disadvantage in lobbying (Năstase and Muurmans 2018: 13), that they would like 
to ameliorate by including other lobbying actors in the TR remit. The perceived inadequateness 
of current disclosure requirements and a concern that stronger penalties will further constrain 
their lobbying may also contribute to their reluctance towards stricter enforcement. 
 Several implications follow. First, the institutional design of voluntary transparency 
clubs may sometimes lead to a suboptimal provision of club goods, which fuels club-members’ 
dissatisfaction and potential shirking. The EU Register enjoys a state-of-the-art online interface 
but does not seem to provide substantive information that is sufficiently relevant and 
reputation-enhancing for its members. This may be partly due to the difficulty of identifying 
what ‘relevant information’ is in the case of lobbying regulation and on the market of ‘virtuous 
participation’ in policymaking. If for voluntary environmental programs it is relatively 
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straightforward to identify the indicators required to signal firms’ environmental-friendly 
behavior, similar indicators are more difficult to define and identify when regulating lobbying. 
An additional, EU-specific challenge is that one important section of the external stakeholders, 
i.e. the general European public, that benefits from the public good of information disclosure, 
is perceived to be largely inactive and less engaged in monitoring the Register and private 
actors’ compliance with its transparency standards.  This questions the extent to which 
regulatory compliance and information disclosure pay off in reputational terms for compliant 
club members. Second, the case of EU TR also signals an interesting transformation that 
voluntary clubs may encounter under certain conditions of suboptimal club standards: members 
adjust to an imperfect setting and use it as a licensing scheme to participate in policymaking. 
This explains the exponential increase in the number of EU registered organizations in the last 
couple of years, despite incessant criticism of Register’s settings and information-provision 
performance. Third, this assessment of primary regulatory targets adds to the complexity and 
drama of political negotiations that are underway for more than two years now on the adoption 
of a new EU interinstitutional agreement on a mandatory Register, and indicates that voluntary 
programs sponsored by government institutions may not be an optimal solution to ensure the 
regulatory governance of interest groups’ participation in policymaking. 
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Table 1. Consultation questions used to measure interest groups’ positions on the *stringency of 
transparency club standards, *membership size and *monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Question                                                                               Frequency distribution of responses 
Stringency of transparency standards   
1.Do you consider the TR a useful tool for regulating 
lobbying?  










2.What is your impression of the Register website design 









3.What is your impression of the Register website 









4.What is your impression of the Register website ease 



















6.What is your impression of the Register website access 









7.Is the right type of information required from the 
registrant?  










8.What is your impression of the overall data quality in 





















10.Do you believe that there are further interactions 
between the EU institutions and interest groups that 







11.Do you agree with the Commission’s view that the 
Council of the EU should participate in the new IIA on a 







Club membership size   















Monitoring and enforcement of club standards  
13.The present procedure for dealing with alerts and 











14.Do you think that the names of organizations that are 
suspended under the alerts and complaints should be 


























Business orgs. 9 102 63 45 219 
Consultancy 6 48 7 0 61 
Professional orgs.  5 51 11 4 71 




28 131 31 13 203 





























Table 3. Testing the Club Transparency Standards hypothesis. 





































































































































































































-397.49 -501.01 -482.81 -460.74 -263.67 -278.26 -359.03 -357.71 -177.84 -203.03 -77.78 
N 623 604 589 559 290 303 433 387 411 350 355 
Note: Ordinal logistic regression models. Models 1, 9, 10, 11 use logit regression analysis. For models 1 and 9 the initial ordered-categorical dependent variables 
were re-coded as dichotomous to account for the very low number of observations in the ‘not useful at all’ and ‘disagree’ response categories. Standard errors 













Table 4: Testing the Club Membership hypothesis (model 12) and Club monitoring and enforcement mechanisms hypothesis (models 13-14). 
 12.TR membership scope 13.Alerts and 
complaints 
14.Publicize name of 
suspended orgs. 
Level of access (Ref. category: non-registered organization) 











































Log Likelihood -379.48 -273.91 -215.02 
N 511 291 374 
Note: Models 12 and 13 use ordinal logistic regression. Model 14 uses a logit regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p <0.001; 
**p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
 
